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Kari Palonen
Parliamentarism: A Politics of 
Temporal and Rhetorical Distances
This paper is a thought experiment, a by-product of my ongoing research on the 
temporal and rhetorical dimensions of democratised politics.1 I am strongly indebt-
ed to the rethinking of representative democracy that both Pierre Rosanvallon and 
Frank Ankersmit have recently conducted in a remarkable series of books.2 My fo-
cus in this paper, however, concerns an aspect to which neither of them has directed 
special attention, namely parliamentarism, or more generally, the parliamentary 
style of politics.
My point is to extend the concept of parliamentarism in two respects seldom dealt 
with by constitutional lawyers, historians and political scientists. First of all, parlia-
mentarism also refers to »government by speaking«3 or »government by discussion«,4 
that is to a rhetorical political culture which is constituted by speaking for and against, 
or, in classical terms arguing in utramque partem.5 In other words, parliamentarism 
refers to a style of politics for which deeds consist primarily of words. Moreover, par-
liamentary politics by speaking differs from other styles insofar as it is conducted with 
the adversaries in the same audience and with the intention to alter or at least shake 
up their views by means of persuasive speeches. This is the main rhetorical difference 
between parliamentary politics by speaking and the rhetorical situation of parties, 
associations or movements, as well as the politics of governments and bureaucracies. 
A common thread running through all of the opposing styles is the absence of the 
adversaries and their consequent lack of opportunity to reply immediately.
In my performative usage parliamentarism also does not refer to a politics con-
ducted at the site of the parliament itself, but to a regime that is constituted by politi-
cally playing with times. The very matter of parliamentary activity is constituted by 
the use of time, both the time of electing the parliament and the internal time of a 
procedure to divide the parliamentary activities into distinct temporal items. In par-
liamentary politics all questions of what and how must be translated into questions 
of when in order to be considered as items on the parliamentary agenda. 
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The link between time and rhetoric lies in the situation in which time in the par-
liamentary style of politics is not only linked to the consumed quantitative time, but 
this time is interrupted by the very acts of speaking for and against. The act of deal-
ing with time politically is present at every stage of the parliamentary process, both 
as a condition and as a medium of politics. The internal division of parliamentary 
times is the relation of the political calendar of debates and decision to daily, weekly 
and annual time, which is interrupted by the electoral terms. 
Aesthetic, temporal and rhetorical distances
With his theory of history as his conceptual background6, Frank Ankersmit has re-
vised our understanding of political representation in terms of an aesthetic distance 
between the represented and representatives. »We can only talk about representation 
where there is difference – and not an identity between the representative and the per-
son represented.«7 One of his most explicit formulations is the following passage from 
Aesthetic Politics. 
In the case of the electorate or the persons to be represented in political repre-
sentation, reality is (…) not a reality that is objectively given to us in one way 
or another. But we may argue that precisely this is what representation is for: 
because there is no objectively given proposal for political action on the part 
of the people represented, and because it would be a category mistake to ex-
pect the existence of such an objectively given proposal, we need representa-
tion in order to be able to define such proposals at all. Representation finds its 
purpose and meaning in the indeterminate and interpretable character of the 
›reality‹ that it is to be represented.8
By distinguishing the aesthetic from a mimetic concept of representation Ankersmit 
dissociates representative democracy from the Rousseauvian assumptions of identity 
between the represented and the representatives. With his theory of an aesthetic gap 
or distance between them, Ankersmit has attributed different political roles to the 
citizen voters and the members of parliament (henceforth: MPs). He has both left the 
represented the chance of exercising political control over the representatives and 
created a legitimation for the practice by which the representatives act as politicians 
with an initiative and a judgment of their own. In short, Frank Ankersmit’s work has 
encouraged us to view parliamentary democracy as superior to the direct democracy 
as opposed to being a mere surrogate of it.9 In accordance with my vision of par-
liamentarism, I shall speculate here on two further dimensions in the aesthetic gap, 
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namely the temporal and rhetorical distances between the representatives and the 
represented in parliamentary democracies. 
In line with Pierre Rosanvallon’s recent work, I regard parliamentary democracy 
as a time-regime. To illustrate the role of time in politics, Rosanvallon quotes Con-
dorcet’s view that we have to distinguish between different temporal layers of poli-
tics: »temps court du référendum ou de la sensure; rythme institutionnel des élec-
tions; temps long de la constitution.«10 Like Rosanvallon I also want to discuss time 
both as a constraint and as a resource,11 although here also accentuating the latter 
and usually neglected aspect.
The advantage of parliamentary politics lies in the chance to engage in a reflected 
use of this rhetorical and temporal distance as opposed to attempting to eliminate it 
by adapting parliamentary time and rhetoric to that of the citizen voters. My point 
is to assess the different aspects of temporal and rhetorical distances as political in-
struments. How does this distance serve the citizens and the parliamentarians? How 
could the acknowledgement of both temporal and rhetorical distance be used as a 
medium of invigorating politics?
In this paper I limit my discussion to the simple ideal types of an individual citi-
zen voter and an individual MP, without considering intermediate cases, such as the 
candidate, the party official or the government minister in parliament. Furthermore, 
I will deal mainly with regular parliamentary elections and the alternation in govern-
ment as a process of such election, excluding revolutions and other types of radical 
constitutional or regime changes.
Temporal distances
My point of departure is a perspective on the temporal scarcity of political agents. Two 
crucial twentieth-century thinkers dealing with temporalisation, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Reinhart Koselleck, have inspired my approach. Koselleck, however, was not particu-
larly interested in the kind of short-term yet non-momentary dimension of time that 
is constitutive of the temporal horizon of the agents in democratised and parliamen-
tary politics.12 Sartre’s discussion on scarcity as the »passive motor of history« con-
centrates mainly on the limit-situations of human life,13 whereas he is not interested in 
using scarcity as a condition and tool of the parliamentary style of politics.
According to my thesis, we can distinguish four different aspects of temporality 
in this type of politics, which I shall refer to as timeliness, momentum, time-span 
and calendar.14 Timeliness refers to the time-bound, ›worldly‹ character of the hu-
man existence, which also serves as both a limitation as well as a chance for the indi-
vidual to do things in her own life-time.15
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This also means that the human political existence is contingent both in its fragility 
and in its openness to change. The democratisation and parliamentarisation of politics 
increases the sense of timeliness by the insight into a polity, of which a regular condi-
tion is the possibility of alternation in government. The momentum in parliamentary 
democracies, in the sense of a turning point and the horizon opened by this turning 
point, is not restricted solely to the kairos of revolutions, wars or other extraordinary 
events. It is rather the regular and recurrent events of elections and alternation in gov-
ernment that are the crux of the matter. The momentum is not restricted to the elec-
tion, but an MP can apply her electoral success as a power share in her parliamentary 
politics. The time-span of politics is oriented toward a future event, above all to the 
next elections. Correspondingly, the time-span is restricted to the electoral term and 
oriented both toward the maintenance vs. overthrow of the present government and 
the re-election of an MP. The momentum and time-span also serve as a point of de-
parture for the formation of a political calendar that divides political activities in time 
and requires the translation of political questions into temporal items. Additions to 
and revisions of the calendar can themselves serve as modes of temporal politicking.
Considering the political situation of both the citizen voter and a member of 
parliament (living at least partly off politics16) we can detect a temporal distance with 
regard to each of the aspects I just discussed. As a rule, this refers to a greater tem-
poral intensity in the life of the parliamentarians than of the citizen voters, although 
each of these dimensions deserves to be the topic of separate discussion here.
The political timeliness of the MP differs from that of the citizen voter in the very 
basis of their political existence. The experience of being ›elected‹ to the parliament is 
more an indicator of the political competence provided by the election than the inclu-
sion into a social elite. Perhaps we might view this idea in Arendtian terms and say 
that if a person has been elected into the parliament, we must consider her as a politi-
cal ›somebody‹ whose views must be counted in politics.17 This is independent of the 
question as to whether or not her election was based on her own political merits. The 
reverse side of this timeliness is its fragility: there is no guarantee than an MP will be 
re-elected at the next elections, and the attempts to secure re-election form a consti-
tutive part of the condition of an MP as a political being.
Neither dimension of this special timeliness is present in the experience of the 
citizen voter. We could say that the MP’s intensified experience of the political time-
liness of her very situation alludes to an existential distance from the temporal hori-
zon of the citizen voter. The political condition of the existence of the latter is not the 
pure status of human beings but the historically formed electoral rights and voting 
systems practised in their own specific context.
As a source of momentum, the election is, of course, also decisive for the MP. 
Despite all the lamentations of the decline of parliamentary powers, it provides her 
115ÖZG 15.2004.3
with an extraordinary chance to act politically. The fact that she is ›elected‹ indicates 
the presence of a chance that can be utilised in different modes and to different de-
grees. Although all the MPs are required to possess at least some level of political 
competence, it is in their politicking within the parliament, or more generally speak-
ing inside and outside the parliament during the electoral term, that distinguishes 
the back-benchers from the ›ministrables‹ and so on. Regarding the political repu-
tation of an MP and her chances for re-election, almost everything depends on her 
performance as an MP. Whether an MP can continue to maintain the momentum 
created by her election depends mainly on her competence as a politician.
The specific power shares available to an MP are by definition not available to the 
citizen voter. Nonetheless, for the citizen voter, too, it is the elections that serve the 
most crucial events in the construction of her own political biography. Elections offer 
the citizen voter an extraordinary chance to both redefine her own ›political identity‹ 
by means of her voting performance and to mark a point of momentum in her po-
litical biography that cannot be forgotten in future elections. We can identify recent 
examples of voting that altered the political identity of the voters when, for example, 
Finnish bourgeois women voted en masse for the Social Democrat Tarja Halonen in 
the second round of the 2000 presidential elections, or, even more extremely, when 
even a number of Trotskyites voted for Jacques Chirac in the second round of the 
2002 elections in order to limit LePen’s share of votes. Another dimension of this 
momentum lies in the process of following the performance of ›their‹ candidate in the 
parliament, not just in the sense of ›keeping promises‹ but also in the more general 
terms of political competence. The temporal distance between the citizen voter and 
the MP refers to the possession of a level of control in the context of the next elections. 
If ›your‹ MP has acted in a manner you previously judged inappropriate, the citizen 
voter has the opportunity to change either her candidate or her own political views.
It seems that the time-span of the MPs differs from that of the citizen voters even 
more radically than the momentum. In this dimension the electoral term is viewed 
from the opposite direction, namely from the approaching elections. The time-span 
of an MP, the political performance during the electoral term, is defined in terms of 
urgency: How much can I achieve as an MP during this parliamentary term? All of 
the measures supported and activities carried out by the MP both inside and outside 
the parliament are, from this point of view, temporal translations into items to be 
dealt with during the current parliamentary term. This allows the MP to concentrate 
on essential tasks and issues at hand and to shift other questions beyond the relevant 
time-span. The political competence of an MP is to a considerable degree assessed 
in terms of the efficiency with which she temporalises her performance during 
the incumbent parliament, although her success in this sense is never guaranteed. 
Another aspect in the time-span lies in the preparation for the next elections in order 
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to secure both the candidature and re-election. The insight into the inherent ur-
gency of the parliamentary performance lies partly in, although is not limited solely 
to, the move toward the next election campaign. The MP is obliged to weigh the 
advantages of increasing political competence against the chances of becoming re-
elected. The decisive point is that success cannot be secured in advance, but both the 
performance and the electoral result is essentially dependent on the judgment of a 
great number of anonymous others.
The political time-span of the citizen voter is different. She does not have to think 
in terms of electoral terms or to prepare for the next elections. Still, as a rule it is only 
the next elections that oblige her to rethink her political identity, and her political self-
identity is, nonetheless, even more punctual and election-oriented than that of an MP. 
With regard to the political identity of the latter it is not only the performance in the 
campaign that matters, but one’s performance as an MP. Every vote and every speech 
may also be turned into a potential source of revision of votes in the next elections. 
Perhaps even more distant from the everyday political life of the citizen voters is 
the political calendar of the MPs. The intensive and extensive temporality of parlia-
mentary politics is highlighted through its distinct procedures and practices. Consti-
tutive of parliamentary politics, as an expression of a rhetorical culture of arguing in 
utramque partem, is its procedural character. The parliamentary events are catego-
rised into different types of questions, such as government proposals and interpella-
tions of the opposition, different kinds of issues, such as legislation, the budget and 
the confidence of the government, as well as different loci of discussion, such as the 
plenary and committee sessions.
The point of parliamentary politics is to divide time between these different types 
of items, and the parliamentary procedure concerns, above all, this temporal divi-
sion by transforming the questions to be discussed into the form of temporal items 
in the parliamentary calendar.18 The priority of procedure over substance in the par-
liamentary style of politics means, strictly speaking, that nothing is so important 
that it should supersede the distinct style of politics contained in the parliamentary 
procedure. Even in the case of urgent situations there are procedures as to how they 
should be dealt with in a parliamentary manner. The parliamentary procedure is by 
implication the first thing to be learnt by an MP – otherwise all her activities would 
be out of place and time. Superior competence as a parliamentary-style politician 
can be only achieved through the use of specific temporalised occasions contained 
in the parliamentary procedure, or perhaps through a distinction in the debates on 
changing the procedure.
The great advantage of politicking for the citizen voter lies, indeed, in the lack of 
the calendarisation of her interventions. Even voting itself is not a quasi-obligatory 
act but rather a situation of control, which should not voluntarily be left unused, at 
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least when some politically ›literate‹ candidates are available. Speaking in Weberian 
terms about the citizen voters as occasional politicians19 by no means requires that a 
maximum level of political interest and personal intervention would be desirable for 
all. My point is that it should be left up to the citizen voter to decide in what situa-
tions, in what manner and to what extent she acts politically. The figure of the intel-
lectual, in the Sartrean sense as someone who intervenes in questions which do not 
concern her,20 is a classical mode of acting as an occasional politician when a situa-
tion arises in which both the need and the means of intervention are at the disposal 
of the citizen voter. One important aspect of their control over parliamentarians lies 
in the disturbance of their calendars, intervening whenever the occasion arises.
For the citizen voters the parliamentary style of politics appears as a spectacle 
with a few visible events, such as budget debates, interpellations and the question 
time in parliament, as the main arenas. Judging as spectators of the parliamentary 
theatre, the citizen voters tend, furthermore, to think in terms of standpoints rather 
than in terms of issues to be thematised, and they do so at the level of oratorical 
performances rather than of political constellations in the parliament, demanding 
either–or decisions as opposed to analysing the ambiguity of the questions at hand. 
As outsiders they insist on the narrowness of the intra-parliamentary schedules and 
the urgencies to overcome them in special situations. This is a mark of their nar-
rowly substantialist understanding of politics, from which the distinct temporality 
of parliamentary politics remains out of sight. 
In the political use of time, the distance between the citizen voter and the par-
liamentary politician is dramatic. A citizen is an occasional politician who is only 
occasionally required to participate in parliamentary politics and only seldom has 
occasion to be involved in it at all. An MP is supposed to continuously participate in 
parliamentary politics in various forms, and she is presented with a number of both 
regular and irregular occasions to do so.
My point is, nonetheless, that it is the situation in which the citizen voter and the 
MP experience a different relation to the times of politics that is decisive as opposed 
to this quantitative difference in participation. For the citizen voter time is mainly 
a backdrop of politics, which may become part of the activity of politicking itself 
only in exceptional cases of urgency or timing one’s actions. For the MP, all ques-
tions have a temporal dimension, and the ability to play with time is an indicator of 
competence in parliamentary politics. This is a game in which temporal questions, 
such as when to act and how to order one’s actions in time or to treat the existing 
parliamentary agenda, are crucial aspects of a successful political career. 
The political situation is constantly changing, even when, from the point of view 
of the citizen voter, it might seem as though nothing is happening. The demands 
included in electoral programmes are either unrealisable or more or less empty in 
118 ÖZG 15.2004.3
terms of their content when translated into the level of political items on the parlia-
mentary agenda. The entire notion of the existence of a preconceived policy with 
regard to an electoral term is intelligible only in terms of using MPs solely as ›button-
pushers‹ for a government’s policy if the supporters require an imperative mandate. 
Such an MP is far from an independent political agent, even if the parliamentary 
procedure and calendar require her to be just that.
The preconceived policy alludes to a style of politicking that does not correspond 
to the times of parliamentary politics, for which every item offers an opportunity for 
change. An alternative view, corresponding to the tight and intense temporality of 
the parliamentary style, could lie in reflective political competence in terms of the 
MPs’ abilities to read the political signs of time. A decisive dimension in the political 
competence and distinction of an MP concerns the act of judging the shifting situ-
ations and constellations in their relationship particularly to the momentum, time-
span and calendar of the incumbent parliament. For example, an MP of the govern-
mental coalition has to reflect on the situations in which she chooses to demonstrate 
her opposition to the government’s policy, on which questions it is worth risking 
sanctions against her party, or on what possible issues a break with the government 
would be worth considering. In such reflections the political timeliness of the MP’s 
situation also becomes clearly visible. 
A rhetorical conception of parliamentarism
The temporal distance is always a rhetorical distance. A parliamentary move has a 
different ethos to a similar move presented by a citizen voter. A proposal with the 
same content as one presented by a citizen voter is a different move when presented 
by an MP, who puts her political weight behind it. It also has a different pathos in 
terms of its presentation to a parliamentary audience. Even a simple parliamentary 
motion that does not get any public attention is inherently politically different from 
the presentation of the move with the same content outside the parliament. 
A parliamentary proposal is politically a different speech act to a similar pro-
posal made outside the parliament. This holds true in the perlocutionary sense of, at 
least in theory, its having a better chance of being officially accepted than any similar 
proposal that is presented in a public debate. It is a performative that is identifiable 
as a parliamentary proposal, which no similar moves in other contexts can ever be. 
Furthermore, as an illocutionary act, a parliamentary proposal cannot be restricted 
to the official aim that it be adopted by the parliament, which is quite illusory in 
the democratic era. It also has other dimensions of linguistic action, for example 
marking a point against the intra-party opponents, indicating a move in an MP’s 
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parliamentary career as a politician or stealing the initiative from another MP repre-
senting the same voter clientele.
The style of the parliamentary rhetoric is deliberative, oriented toward weighing 
the advantages and disadvantages of proposals. Other rhetorical genres, the epideic-
tic aspect of beautiful speeches and the forensic aspect of judging the character and 
significance of past acts, must be subordinated to the deliberative genre in parlia-
mentary eloquence. Deliberations, which aim at acquiring the majority of votes in 
the parliament, also differ from negotiations, which aim at reaching a compromise 
between parties. Compromises reached through negotiation are a part of parliamen-
tary practice, but they are always conducted with the majority principle as the ultima 
ratio in the background.21 The estimation of numerical majorities is a crucial aspect 
of the eventual modifications of the proposals in order to achieve at least some re-
sults or to alter the terms of the current political constellation. Outside parliament 
there is no similar priority given to the deliberative genre of weighing the alterna-
tives over other rhetorical genres, nor to taking the current political constellation in 
consideration.
The distinctive quality of parliamentary deliberations is, however, a direct result 
of the procedural quality of parliamentary politics. Even a majority cannot override 
parliamentary procedure, especially those procedures intended to ensure that both 
opinions for and against are heard in the presence of the adversaries at each stage of 
the parliamentary process. The procedure also requires the MPs to transform their 
proposals from what-questions to when-questions. The same holds true with regard 
to the introduction of new items to the agenda or debates surrounding the proce-
dure itself. 
Historically, it is in the parliamentary procedure that we can see most explicitly 
how what Quentin Skinner referred to in his Reason and Rhetoric in the Philoso-
phy of Hobbes as »the rhetorical culture of the Renaissance« is politically continued 
in the English parliament. In Renaissance England »the most important activities 
of a good citizen are essentially rhetorical in character.«22 Skinner quotes Francis 
Bacon’s concept of »the politic part of eloquence« and characterizes it as »the force 
of which derives from the capacity to help a speaker to adjust his arguments to suit 
different audiences.«23 The politic part of eloquence required, in other words, the 
acceptance of the Roman ideal of arguing in utramque partem: »The dictum that 
there will always be two sides to any question eventually became proverbial, and 
already underpins the treatment of proverbs and loci communes in many writers of 
the English Renaissance.«24
The ideal of arguing for and against as the cornerstone of the history of par-
liamentary procedure is emphasised in the Austrian jurist Josef Redlich’s classical 
study Recht und Technik des Englischen Parlamentarismus. A number of specific 
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parliamentary practices, such as the parliamentary immunity of the MPs, the equal-
ity of the MPs to one another and the neutrality of the speaker, only become intel-
ligible in terms of a rhetorical conception.25
The act of speaking for and against in the presence of one’s adversaries is reflect-
ed in the organisation of parliamentary procedures in terms of a rotation between 
speeches presenting opposing views. Accordingly, the entire parliamentary proce-
dure is based on the practice in which opposing points of view are heard and dis-
cussed at each phase of dealing with a particular issue. The monotonous repetition of 
the same standpoint for hours at a time easily becomes a target in anti-parliamentary 
politics. In the French Third Republic, the president of the Assembly had the duty to 
keep the debate lively by rotating the speakers for and against.26 The temporal and 
rhetorical character of parliamentary procedures also alludes to the priority of the 
procedure over its substance as a decisive characteristic of parliamentary politics.
The procedural principle of a rotation between speakers illustrates most ex-
plicitly the rhetorical culture of arguing in utramque partem. This rhetorical view 
on parliamentarism can be contrasted with another famous view, namely the thesis 
that the point of parliamentarism lies in the ›search for truth.‹ Its main proponents 
are François-Pierre Guizot and Carl Schmitt. The former claims that the discussion 
»oblige des pouvoirs à chercher en commun la vérité«,27 whereas Schmitt puts forth 
the following thesis in his Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentaris-
mus: »Das Parlament aber ist der Platz, wo man deliberiert, d.h. in einem diskur- 
siven Vorgang, durch die Erörterung von Argument und Gegenargument, die rela-
tive Wahrheit gewinnt.«28 Schmitt refers to Guizot, but seems to go so far as to con-
sider this to be the point of »government by discussion.«
If we turn our attention to the main classics of British nineteenth century parlia-
mentary government, however, no such reference to truth can be found. In his Essay 
on Political Tactics (written 1791/published 1818), Jeremy Bentham characterises 
the parliamentary procedure as a strictly negative task of avoiding inconveniences 
in the parliamentary practice. »The object is to avoid the inconveniences, to prevent 
difficulties, which must result from a large assembly of men being called to deliber-
ate in common. The art of the legislator is limited to the prevention of everything 
which might prevent the development of their liberty and their intelligence.«29 Simi-
larly, in Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill explicitly 
insists on the role of listening to opposite views. He regards the parliament as »(a) 
place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause 
even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests 
and opinions, can compel them to listen.«30 For Walter Bagehot, »a government by 
discussion (…) at once breaks down the yoke of fixed customs.«31 In other words, 
it indicates a moment of rupture as opposed to one of producing harmony. When 
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judging the originality of the English achievements in »government by discussion«, 
he adds that »it has developed more of all kinds of people ready to use their mental 
energy in their own way.«32 
The regular presence of opposed views also distinguishes parliamentarism as a 
paradigm of a rhetorical political culture from the sociological view of the parlia-
ment as a locus of conversation among others, which has been popular since Jürgen 
Habermas’s Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.33 The parliament is no place for po-
lite conversation, as was the practice in the clubs, salons, coffee-houses and so on, 
for none of them was based on the regular presence of adversaries. Rather, they sat 
in the competing clubs, salons and coffee-houses, or used journals and publishing 
companies for mutual conversation at distance. In other words, the great advantage 
of the parliament lies precisely in the situation in which the adversaries are not lo-
cated outside the audience, but actually sit in the same audience as the adherents. In 
this sense the chance of the inherent possibility in parliamentary politics lies in the 
persuasion of one’s adversaries or becoming persuaded by them. It is precisely for 
this reason that the parliament also needs a procedure that includes regulations that 
might sound ›Byzantine‹ to outsiders, as Eugène Pierre, the long-term secretary of 
the president of the French Assemblée nationale, remarked.34
The aesthetic, temporal and rhetorical gap between the MPs and the citizen vot-
ers is based on the situation that the parliamentarians are exposed to an intense 
thematisation of time and speech. A tacit requirement for the parliamentarian is to 
learn the procedure, to which, both the rhetorical and temporal dimension of poli-
tics is built in. In this sense an MP can both time her actions and situate them in the 
context of controversies in an extraordinary manner. Similar requirements – and 
occasions – are hardly ever posed for other types of politicians, inclusive the profes-
sional party functionary and the lobbyist.
As compared with the MP, the citizen voters have a greater freedom to choose 
when and how to act politically. They can be content just with voting, engage in 
punctual interventions in the case of crisis, in which the ›politics-as-usual‹ seem not 
to be sufficient, or participate in movements that more or less regularly follow the 
parliamentary and governmental politics from a critical distance.
As a complement to the routine parliamentary practices of the MP, competent oc-
casional politicians among the citizen voters are also highly valuable. Such occasional 
politicians outside the parliament would be able to read new signs of time in the po-
litical conditions, constellations, styles and concepts, which tend to be lost in the daily 
parliamentary struggles. Or, the parliamentarians manage the rhetoric of politicking 
within a given Spielraum, but sometimes it is the occasional politicians outside the 
parliament who are more fluent in the rhetoric of politicisation that also opens new 
Spielräume, or, better yet, Spielzeiträume, also for parliamentary politics.35
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Citizen voters as MPs of the election-day 
One of the main potential pitfalls faced by the MP is to consider the world as reflec-
tive of the parliament and to misjudge the political effect of their debates and deci-
sion on the lives of the citizen voters. Another failure of the insider perspective of an 
MP might lie in the routinisation of all parliamentary decisions and in not grasping 
what is crucial and what is secondary. In both respects, the rhetorical control ex-
erted by the voters both in elections and in public debates play a crucial role in the 
extension of the audience of parliamentary deliberations. The deliberative rhetoric 
among occasional politicians indicates a moment of control with regard to the af-
firmation of the rhetorical culture of parliamentary democracies.
Most aspects of parliamentary eloquence remain outside the rhetorical reper-
toire of the citizen voters. Parliamentarians live in a highly rhetorical culture, which 
is distant from that of the everyday life of almost anyone. The practices of a ›bour-
geois‹ life do neither require constant deliberation between alternatives or an esti-
mation of the political effects of one’s own activities. The priority of procedure over 
substance frequently appears to be incomprehensible from the viewpoint of ›every-
day life‹, and the notion that words are deeds may be even more difficult to accept. 
In the sphere of ›bourgeois‹ life and work, the rhetorical view that in every case one 
has good grounds to argue for opposite viewpoints would easily lead to not getting 
anything done. In this sense we can easily understand at least some of the antiparlia-
mentary commonplaces, such as the accusations of bavardage.36
In a famous passage from Du contrat social, Jean-Jaques Rousseau writes: »le 
peuple anglais pense être libre; il se trompe fort, il ne l’est que durant l’élection des 
membres du parlement.«37 This passage is commonly used to legitimate a critique of 
electoral and parliamentary politics. This critique presupposes that voting implies 
the renunciation of one’s voice to the representatives, a view that is well expressed in 
the German term Stimmabgabe, and even more explicitly in the old practice of the 
Wahlkapitulationen of the electors in the Holy Roman Empire.
Now we could practise a paradiastolic rhetorical redescription38 and, sharing 
Rousseau’s view on liberty as the absence of dependence,39 give his dictum another 
normative variation. We could do so by inverting the common understanding of 
the relationship between elections and parliamentary politics and by understand-
ing voting as an act of the prolongation of the parliamentary activities by the entire 
electorate. In other words, every voter should consider herself to be an MP on elec-
tion-day – that is, to use her political imagination and make and attempt to decide 
between the candidates as if she herself were an MP. John Stuart Mill’s ideal that »he 
would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended upon him 
alone«40 provides a good approximation of that practice.
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In his Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland, Max Weber accentuates an-
other dimension in the freedom of the voter.41 For Weber, the political point of vot-
ing lies in the possibility of the citizen to transcend her social ›being‹ by her own 
›doing‹, that is to act independently of her socio-economic position as an individual 
and equal citizen among others.42 The citizen voter is free on the election-day in the 
sense that she acts in the ballot box in the same manner as an MP deliberating and 
deciding between alternatives in the parliament. In the elections, the alternatives are 
incarnated in the candidates themselves. The point is not to regard the parliament 
as an extension of the distribution of the already existing opinions among the vot-
ers, but, conversely, to view the elections as an occasion to extend the parliamentary 
deliberation and decision to the citizen voters. When Weber speaks of citizens as 
occasional politicians and not as opposed to politicians,43 the point can be extended 
in similar terms to include the voters as MPs of the election-day. 
In 1895, the Paris correspondent of the Viennese Neue Freie Presse, Theodor 
Herzl, published a book on the French parliament entitled Das Palais Bourbon. He 
accepted the common disgust with the parliament as a lived reality, but wanted to 
rehabilitate the political value of parliamentary government and understood that 
something must be changed in this respect. He made the following proposal, quoted 
from the 1995 French re-publication:
Quelque chose doit changer. Ou bien le mode d’expression de la vie pub-
lique doit redevenir honnête, à la manière d’autrefoirs; ou bien le peuple »sou-
verain« doit se familiariser avec la transformation du langage, afin qu’il ne se 
sente plus trompé lorsque les vieux discours prennent un sens nouveau, plus 
subtil ou plus vicieux. Si le peuple et le parlement ne se comprennent pas, 
toute cette forme de gouvernement est remise en question.44
Judged in retrospect, the parliamentary mode of government has not been quite as 
discredited as Herzl feared. Still, his idea that the citizen voters should have a better 
understanding of the parliamentary transformation of language and its politically 
motivated conceptual changes is extremely valuable also in terms of the rhetorical 
and temporal distance between the parliamentarians and the citizen voters. This 
distance should not, however, be reduced to a parliamentarisation of everyday life. 
Still, both the transfer of the parliamentary procedure to the election process and 
the application of analogies of it to the deliberations and decisions in non-parlia-
mentary instances would help the citizen voters to better understand the singularity 
of the parliamentary style of politics. Similarly, such analogies could increase their 
chances to act like parliamentarians both on election-day and in other situations of 
ambiguous deliberation. For the citizen voters, it is time to give up the ideal that the 
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MPs would be ›like themselves.‹ Instead, we need parliamentarians who are proud 
of being politicians.
The antiparliamentary populists have by no means lost their standing. It is, 
nonetheless, my conclusion that the main enemies of the parliamentary style of 
politics are those MPs who want to be like ›ordinary people.‹ There are MPs who do 
not want and do not dare to face the radical contingency of politics. They want to 
capitulate to the requirement of translating politics into temporal terms and before 
the confrontation with a plurality of alternatives in the rhetorically constructed par-
liamentary deliberations. What is needed is MPs who want to be politicians and who 
take on the challenges of rhetorical and temporal distance to the citizen voters.
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